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HeinOnline --156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1553 2007 -2008 What happened when the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA)' encountered the federal judges-did the courts match the congressional ardor for class action reform? In an effort to answer this question, we studied the cases decided under the Act after its enactment on February 18, 2005, and before our cutoff of August 18, 2007. We measured judicial activity and receptivity in regard to the Act. It turned out not to be a matter of CAFA ipsa loquitur, because the courts played a role in reshaping the Act. By examining at close range the thing adjudged, we saw social waste by litigation, and we saw wise but value-laden resistance byjudges.
I. BACKGROUND
The Republican Congress, in enacting the Class Action Fairness Act, gave it a broad scope covering interstate class actions, with the expressed intent of defeating the plaintiffs' bar's manipulation of state courts. When the Republican President George W. Bush signed it into law, he declared that it "marks a critical step toward ending the § 1712, Congress ratcheted up the judicial scrutiny applicable to a federal CAFA or non-CAFA class action's settlement terms that provide for recovery of discount coupons by class members.
More important for present purposes was the Act's expansion of federal subject matter jurisdiction for class actions or mass actions' that were commenced on or after the enactment date. In 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d), Congress bestowed original jurisdiction on the federal district courts for sizable multistate class actions, generally those in which DISTRICT COURTS 77-78 (1996) , available at http://www.fjc.gov/public/ pdf.nsf/lookup/rule23.pdf/$file/rule23.pdf (similar); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements: An Empirical Study, I J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27, 60 (2004) (finding questionable types of "soft" relief, such as injunctive relief or coupons, present in 7% of published federal and state class action settlements, while finding evidence of beneficial soft relief in 12% of the settlements). However, the early cases we studied would not likely involve many disputes over settlement terms. Coming after our study 's period was Figueroa v. Sharper Image Corp., 517 F. Supp. 2d 1292 , 1306 -11 (S.D. Fla. 2007 , in which the court described various objections made to a proposed settlement agreement. See Linda S. Mullenix, CAFA and Coupons, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 12, 2007, at 24 (stressing the Figueroa settlement's coupon component and the court's "in-depth analysis of procedural and substantive fairness of coupon settlements in a post-CAFA world"). 5 "Mass actions" are actions involving numerous plaintiffs that, while not technically class actions, are joined by some procedure. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(11) (Supp. V 2005) . In our coded database, only two cases involved a mass action, Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184 , 1218 -21 (11th Cir. 2007 ) (declining jurisdiction, in the course of a major opinion), affg Lowery v. Honeywell Int'l, Inc., 460 F. Supp. 2d 1288 (N.D. Ala. 2006 ; Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 686-70 (9th Cir. 2006 ) (declining jurisdiction), and only three other cases discussed mass actions, Garcia v. Boyar & Miller, P.C., No. 06-1936 -D, 2007 Wl 1556961, at *4 n.3 (N.D. Tex. May 30, 2007 ) (declining to treat the cases as a mass action, without any real dispute); Lester v. Exxon Mobil Corp., No. 06-9158, 2007 1AIL 1029507, at *2 (E.D. La. Mar. 29, 2007 (finding a removal petition to be premature, and thus not deciding whether the action was a mass or class action); In re Prempro Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 03-1507 , 2007 WL 641416, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Feb. 27, 2007 ("A review of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint makes it clear that this is a class action, not a mass action.").
HeinOnline --156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1556 Rev. 2007 Rev. -2008 the plaintiff class contains at least 100 members and their claims aggregated together exceed $5 million, exclusive of interest and costs. The Act does not require complete diversity, but rather minimal diversity, which means that only one member of the class must differ in citizenship from any one defendant:
(2) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which-(A) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant; (B) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and any defendant is a citizen of a State; or (C) any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state.6 This jurisdiction, by a bewilderingly complicated qualification in subsection (4) of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d), does not extend either to a class action in which two-thirds or more of the plaintiff members are citizens of the state where the action was filed and the primary defendants are also local citizens (the "home state" exception) or to a class action in which there are certain other markers of localism (the "local controversy" exception). Under subsection (3), if that fraction falls between one-third and two-thirds, and if the primary defendants are citizens of the state where the action was filed, the district court may discretionarily decline jurisdiction over what it sees as an essentially local case. The statute goes on to carve out other cases from federal jurisdiction in subsection (5) (A) (certain actions where the primary defendants are governmental) and subsection (9) (certain securities and corporate actions).
In 28 U.S.C. § 1453, Congress further provided that any defendant can remove a class action from state court to the local federal district court-but only, as one presumes in accordance with the clear legislative history despite the absence of appropriate statutory wording, if the action would be within the original federal jurisdiction of § 1332(d). The statute goes on to say that the removing defendant can be a local citizen and need not seek the consent of the other defendants.
already generated much litigation on some other questions, especially on the Act's effective date and threshold jurisdictional questions, including the burden and standard of proof. We wanted to systematically explore that case law. Dec. 20, 2006) . Bonime involved an Erie issue regarding the applicability of state law class action limitations in federal court, with the court applying state law to defeat the federal class action.
II. METHODOLOGY
8 Our coding turned up not a single dispute over venue. This result is less surprising once one realizes that most of these CAFA cases involved removal, where venue is indisputably proper in and only in the local federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (2000) . Original cases were seemingly all brought where a substantial part of the claim arose. See 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (a) (2), (b) (2) (2000) (listing a 'judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred" as a proper venue for a civil action).
HeinOnline --156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1558 Rev. 2007 Rev. -2008 very tip of the mass of grievances, and it is sometimes tough to infer from that tip truths about the underlying mass of disputes or what lies below the disputes.9 More to the point, a rather small percentage of judicial decisions appear as published opinions.'° Those published 9 Nevertheless, substantial evidence exists that case characteristics often transcend litigation's filtering process. That is, studies of subsets of litigated cases can yield insights broader than the studied subset. See Theodore Eisenberg, Negotiation, Lawyering, and Adjudication: Kritzer on Brokers and Deals, 19 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 275, 292-93 (1994) Ct. 1955 Ct. , 1965 Ct. -66 (2007 , which imposed a plausibility test on pleadings, thereby discombobulating a basic area of law and managing to generate 2200 citations in its first five months. See Resnik, supra note 3, at 1949-51.
19 A few cases showed tIp more than once, either as subsequent steps at the trial court level or on appeal. We counted each different published opinion separately. 20 We obtained the weighted filings from DUFF, supra note 10, at 414 tbl.X-1A, and [a]s removal becomes more predictable, plaintiff attorneys might decide to file actions initially in federal court to avoid the costs and delays associated with removal.... In that way, plaintiff attorneys retain a choice of forum at least to the extent that, in a given case, jurisdiction and venue rules allow filing in more than one federal forum.
Probably the difference shows merely that among CAFA class actions, removed cases are the ones generating pitched battles and hence published opinions, and especially opinions that expressly mention CAFA. The difference between the two studies thus may reflect the danger of relying only on published cases to get a picture of what is really hap-
281
pening on the ground. The reader must therefore bear in mind that our study features memorable threshold battles. Meanwhile, the FJC is telling us that practitioners may be seeing a lot of cases proceeding directly to struggles over certification and the merits, without any meaningful pause at the threshold. The result would be that our impression of CAFA litigation would differ from some practitioners'. Nevertheless, our skewed sample of published opinions still holds some lessons for those practitioners.
On the one hand, if certain plaintiffs' decisions to institute suit in federal court have resulted in less litigation over threshold issues, while by contrast those other plaintiffs who choose to file in state court are running into a pretty high number of threshold battles, then we could suggest that those who voluntarily choose to file suit in federal court have engaged in sound strategic decision making, at least in terms of reducing litigation costs and time delays.
On the other hand, these immediate savings might turn out not to be worth it. If the state court plaintiffs are actually winning a good share of the CAFA battles and getting remanded, while in the cases that stay in federal court the federal judges turn out to be more parsimonious with certification and possibly more unreceptive on the merits than some state judges (as defendants and lawmakers thought they would be 29 ), then the short-term gain of avoiding the threshold In any event, the election of federal court by only some plaintiffs creates a selection effect. Plaintiffs who are more squarely within the reach of CAFA presumably would tend to choose federal court. Unless defendants become more selective in choosing which state court cases to remove, the plaintiffs' selectivity will raise the plaintiff win rate in battles over entry to federal court. HeinOnline --156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1564 Rev. 2007 Rev. -2008 As to the nature of the claims involved, the cases in our database overwhelmingly involved state law and, indeed, were mostly contract (including insurance) cases. 3° The other noteworthy lesson of the data underlying Tables 1 and 2 is that the total number of published cases, once they got going, has remained relatively steady over time.
Note that 2006 is our only complete calendar year, so the midway peak is an illusion.
B. Nature of Issues
Many of these CAFA cases involved transitional problems, which a more carefully drafted statute could have avoided. This sloppy drafting 3 ' created a lot of unnecessary social friction and costly litigation by not foreseeing things like effective-date problems. We can show this by examining more closely the nature of the CAFA issues the courts were deciding.
Most of the early disputes over CAFA involved effective-date questions 2--ith jurisdictional issues coming in second, but finishing strong. The numbers for "other issue" are low; they proportionately REv. 1593 REv. , 1615 REv. -21 (2008 , which argues that the increased likelihood of litigating in federal court encourages contract claims and discourages tort claims.
31 The winner for sloppiness is CAFA's authorization of immediate appeal from certain jurisdictional decisions by district courts, but only if litigants appeal "not less than 7 days after entry of the order"-when Congress meant "not more than 7 days." See Adam N. (26), and other excepted claims (10). The total for jurisdictional provisions in Table 3 is less than the sum of the numbers in this footnote because Table 3 gives the number of opinions that involved one or more of these jurisdictional codes.
UNIVERSITY OFPEANSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 156:1553 increase for the appellate decisions only because some difficult questions of appellate jurisdiction fall into this category. 34 Incidentally, the numbers in Tables 3 and 4 add up to more than the total number of opinions, because a single opinion can decide multiple issues.
We present disputes over jurisdictional burden and standard of proof separately because we discuss them in detail below.
34 In addition to the rare case involving a mass action, see supra note 5 and accompanying text, or choice of law, see supra note 7 and accompanying text, the "other issue" category in the district courts overwhelmingly involved threshold issues-usually ones with ajurisdictional flavor that did not fall within our specific jurisdictional codes. For example, the most common of these issues involved whether jurisdiction over a removed case survived denial of certification. The courts' treatment of these "other issues" was typical of their treatment of the cases in general, with judicial resistance to CAFA on these particular issues registering at 64%. See infra text accompanying Table 6 .
HeinOnline --156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1566 Rev. 2007 Rev. -2008 We realize that a democratic political system will sometimes yield vague and ambiguous statutes, and that the courts are used to working with them. So CAFA is far from unique in creating wasteful litigation. Nonetheless, Congress did an especially poor job here on a predictably important subject, despite spending eight years in the drafting process. The result has been much more social waste due to CAFA than to comparable statutes. And that waste will-ironically-offset any of the benefits that CAFA's supporters were attempting to create by corralling "wasteful" class action litigation.
Still, however wasteful it otherwise was, this flood of CAFA litigation has at least managed to shed some light, albeit of variable intensity. Two examples illustrate the different contributions the courts have made. First, the burden of proof on jurisdiction is a matter that CAFA itself failed to treat, even though its legislative history muddied the question. The result was a lot of litigation attempting to produce clarification just to get us to a point from which the statute could have started.
35 Second, the standard of proof on jurisdiction has been a longstanding problem, albeit a finer technical point that Congressmore understandably-completely ignored. This issue has produced much less litigation, which has not managed to move the dispute toward resolution. We should expand on both issues.
Burden of Proof
A frequent point of contention in CAFA cases has been the determination of who bears the burden of proof on jurisdiction when the defendant removes: the plaintiff who brought suit or the defendant who invoked federal jurisdiction. The burden-of-proof question generated 32 disputes in our district court cases and 11 in our court of appeals cases. In conformity with the traditional rule, consensus under CAFA has settled on imposing the burden for jurisdictional re- Under this traditional rule, the defendants, having removed the case to the district court, would bear the burden of establishing the court's jurisdiction. The defendants contend, however, that this traditional rule frustrates CAFA's motivating congressional purpose of expanded access to the federal courts....
The uncertainty surrounding the burden of proof in CAFA cases arises not from the text of CAFA itself-which is silent on the matterbut from a few discrete excerpts of the statute's legislative history.... Although several district courts have followed this apparent congressional intent in shifting the burden of proof onto the plaintiff, the courts Cir. 2007 ) ("We note in passing that the law of this circuit shifts the burden of proving the applicability of exceptions to CAFA's removal jurisdiction to the plaintiff seeking a remand."). For a difficult example, note that the courts have come uniformly to treat the one-third and two-thirds provisions of § 1332(d)(3)-(4) as exceptions, even though excellent arguments exist that they should form part of the prima facie showing of jurisdiction. See Hoffman, supra note 13, at 27-28 (arguing the same for § 1332(d) (5) and (9)).
HeinOnline --156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1568 Rev. 2007 Rev. -2008 of appeals have been reluctant to make the shift from such a "longstanding, near-canonical nile." We have recently joined the Second, Third, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits in following the settled practice of placing the burden of proof on the removing [CAFA] defendant.3
Standard of Proof
The second issue, the standard of proof, is more difficult, but only 5 of our district cases and 9 of our appellate cases addressed it. 39 The context was almost always a dispute about jurisdictional amount upon removal. Nevertheless, the cases split dramatically.
a. Non-CAFA Cases
The background on this latter issue is that under the prevailing St. Paul test of "legal certainty," for the plaintiff to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement for original jurisdiction in a diversity case when the complaint pleads a claim for more than $75,000, the plaintiff need show only a legal possibility that the judgment could exceed $75,000 under the applicable law if the plaintiff were to prevail. 4 ' The plaintiff can pass this test easily, especially in unliquidated tort cases, because jurisdiction will exist even though a recovery over $75,000 is, on the facts, highly unlikely. That is, because the jurisdictional amount and the merits overlap, courts do not apply the preponderance standard that is usual for issues of pure jurisdiction but instead ask for no more than a very modest factual showing to establish jurisdiction: the plaintiff can rebut legal certainty by establishing merely a legal possibility or, in other words, by establishing that a reasonable factfinder could award more than the jurisdictional amount. In sum, the jurisdictional-amount test, as applied to the damages that might be recovered, is actually a prima facie standard of proof that in essence requires a factual showing of a reasonable possibility of exceed-41 ing the floor amount.
However, for the defendant to remove on the basis of diversity, when the plaintiff did not plead any amount or pleaded $75,000 or less, and did not make a binding disclaimer of damages in excess of Decision, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 1115 , 1118 -20 (1987 (grouping standards of proof into three categories: "more-likely-than-not," "much-more-likely-than-not," and "virtual certainty"). So, under the Meritcare approach, the defendant must show that any recovery almost certainly will exceed $75,000.
44 Between legal certainty and preponderance, there is conceivably the standard of high probability, which would require the defendant to show that any recovery much more likely than not will exceed $75,000. Eleventh Circuit in Lowery followed its non-CAFA precedent to apply the preponderance standard. Curiously, on this particular issue, the court did not cite another panel's earlier CAFA decision that had 52 applied the preponderance standard. Strikingly, however, the Lowery court all but ridiculed its own approach:
There is a unique tension in applying a fact-weighing standard to a factfree context....
... We note, however, that in situations like the present one-where damages are unspecified and only the bare pleadings are available-we are at a loss as to how to apply the preponderance burden meaningfully .... ... Regardless, our precedent compels us to continue forcing this square peg into a round hole. Insightfully, the court suggested that the "unabashed guesswork" in the search for a "readily deducible" amount might in effect push the actual standard toward the higher legal-certainty standard. 4 Similarly, a district court in the Sixth Circuit ruled that "CAFA does not alter" the problem, and so it applied its non-CAFA precedent in support of the preponderance standard. 55 The Second Circuit did note on the reasonable-possibility standard mixes in additional legal-certainty cases, the footnote on the substantial-possibility standard mixes in additional preponderance standard cases. These offsetting errors leave the preponderance standard clearly in the ascendancy. " also followed its non-CAFA precedent, 59 but this precedent meant a legal-certainty standard. Although one of its district courts had earlier found the circuit law on the precise point to be unsettled 6 and the Morgan court spoke with little clarity, another district court in the circuit later read its words to mean "that the Defendants must prove the requisite amount in controversy, $5 million, to a legal certainty.
'
New complications, however, arose in the Ninth Circuit. In Lowdermilk, its most recent CAFA case on the point in our dataset, the Ninth Circuit abandoned its allegiance in non-CAFA cases to the preponderance standard, deciding in favor of the legal-certainty test for CAFA cases.6 2 The Lowdermilk court stressed the limited nature of federal jurisdiction and the idea that the plaintiff is master of the complaint.
63
But the holding may be limited to the facts of that case, wherein the plaintiff pleaded damages below the jurisdictional amount. Shortly before, another panel had applied the preponderance standard in a CAFA case in which the plaintiffs complaint did not specify damages.
6 4 Some earlier non-CAFA cases had also distinguished between the plaintiffs not pleading damages and the plain- tiff's pleading less than the jurisdictional amount.
6
' And subsequently the Ninth Circuit did try to limit Lowdermilk to CAFA cases in which the plaintiffs complaint clearly specified inadequate damages. 6 6 Finally, the Seventh Circuit adopted a complicated standard in Brill, the only one of these CAFA cases to develop a standard that upheld federal jurisdiction.
6 7 The Brill court seems to have required merely as a burden of production that the defendant show by a preponderance that the claim exceeded the jurisdictional amount. At the same time, the court said that this showing would sustain federal jurisdiction unless the plaintiff could come back to show to a legal certainty that the claim did not meet the jurisdictional amount. The court's motivation to complicate matters was the usual concern with the difficulty of applying a factual standard to an undeveloped factual record. Some earlier non-CAFA cases had deployed the same burdenshifting approach.
c. Optimal Approach
The messy CAFA cases at least generate an incentive to rethink the whole problem of measuring jurisdictional amount upon removal. To begin, courts seem to find it all too natural to invoke the phrase "legal certainty," because the Supreme Court in St. Paul enshrined that phrase as the very permissive test for the plaintiffs invocation of original jurisdiction. 9 Upon the defendant's invocation of removal jurisdiction, however, the phrase becomes ambiguous, with possible meanings spread across three major camps:
1. At one extreme, "legal certainty" could mean by direct analogy that the defendant has to show merely a reasonable possibility that the jurisdictional amount exists. In other words, whoever invokes federal jurisdiction, be it plaintiff or defen- 283, 289-90 (1938) .
HeinOnline --156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1574 Rev. 2007 Rev. -2008 dant, has to show only a possibility of being right about the jurisdictional amount. This approach treats plaintiffs and defendants equally, 7 0 and it somewhat curtails plaintiffs' tactical abuse in provisionally making lowball claims to preclude removal.
7
' However, it makes no sense to allow the defendant to dislodge the plaintiff from state court on as minimal a showing as that required by St. Paul for a plaintiff to invoke federal jurisdiction; under the prevailing philosophy of jurisdiction, more should be required to dislodge a party from a proper court than is initially required to invoke jurisdiction. 2. Accordingly, most courts applying "legal certainty" have jumped to the other extreme, converting the phrase to mean that the defendant must show a virtual certainty that the jurisdictional amount exists. Part of the reason for this conversion might be semantic, in that the phrase "legal certainty" carries its own impetus to mean what it says and thus impose a very high standard rather than a very low standard. Another reason was that this removal issue arose in an era different from St. Paul's, at a time when enforcing limits on access to the overworked federal courts (especially on the basis of diversity)
• 72 was quite appealing. In any event, the conversion is not necessarily illogical in relation to St. Paul: under this approach, for both original and removal jurisdiction, the plaintiff, as master of forum-choice, gets his or her way if there is a possibility that his or her position onjurisdictional amount is correct. 3. Many courts do not feel limited to these two choices. Given the stark choice that the phrase "legal certainty" offers between a pro-defendant approach and a pro-plaintiff approach, most circuit courts in non-CAFA cases have succumbed to the allure of compromise. 73 And of course the phrase "preponderance of the evidence" is also in the air, because it is the 70 See Noble-Allgire, supra note 42, at 699-703, 718-19 (arguing that the St. Paul legal-certainty test "simply puts the defendant in precisely the same position as a plaintiff who filed the action directly in federal court in the first place," and that this is consistent with the policy behind removal statutes do not overlap the merits. Here, however, any sort of preponderance standard cannot escape the central incoherence caused by applying a fact-weighing standard to an undeveloped factual record. We see this incoherence as a major argument against any middle standard, such as a preponderance approach. Although courts are fairly adept at applying the legal-certainty standard without full discovery and without an evidentiary hearing (such as on motions for summary judgment), courts find curtailing the opponent's procedural opportunities for factual development to become more questionable as the standard moves from a legal-certainty extreme toward the middle standard of preponderance. Moreover, a middle standard would, in theory, more often necessitate jurisdictional dismissals during or after trial, when the facts get better developed. These difficulties are huge.
"
The CAFA appellate cases are picking up on this incoherence. Lowery, Morgan, Lowdermilk, and Brill all express some degree of repulsion from factual standards and therefore incline toward returning to a legal-certainty approach-and because of the aforementioned weight of authority and policy arguments, these four cases mostly lean toward the more demanding of the two versions of the legal-certainty test. Indeed, that workable legal-certainty test, under which the defendant must show to a virtual certainty that the jurisdictional amount exists, has prevailed in many district courts and in at least one circuit 76 court for non-CAFA cases.
We find the major argument for the demanding legal-certainty test lying in the often-overlooked fact that the courts here are engaged not in some common-law endeavor but in construing the removal statutes. 7 The purpose of those statutes is not to favor defendants blindly but to even things up somewhat by giving them the delimited power, 74 See, e.g., McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936) (noting the general proposition that a plaintiff must support his or her claim of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence).
75 See generally Clermont, supra note 41 (discussing the need to avoid problems of jury right, resjudicata, and collateral attack). 76 See supra notes 42-49 and accompanying text. 77 Moreover, the courts give a strict construction to the removal statutes, and "the trend of the decisions is to restrict and limit the removal jurisdiction of the federal courts." 14B WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 42, § 3721, at 340.
HeinOnline --156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1576 Rev. 2007 Rev. -2008 in some but not all circumstances, to counter a plaintiffs choice of state court for a suit that is within federal jurisdiction. The main thrust of the statutes, then, was to tie the scope of removal jurisdiction to the scope of original jurisdiction.
79 Accordingly, any policy arguments about helping or hindering defendants are secondary to arguments based on the relative scope of removal and original jurisdiction. More particularly, under the statutes, the defendant can remove only if the suit, as put forward by the plaintiff, is necessarily within the federal jurisdiction. The plaintiff is master of the complaint, and so can refuse to plead a federal question or to demand in excess of the jurisdictional amount. The plaintiff can thereby defeat removal, unless a federal question is necessarily in play, such as through preemption,"' or unless the demanding legal-certainty test certifies that more than $75,000 is necessarily at stake. Any less-demanding test for jurisdictional amount, like the preponderance approach, means that defendants could remove suits that are not within federal original jurisdiction and thus violate the most basic theme of the removal statutes.
78 See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000) (disadvantaging defendants relative to plaintiffs by disallowing removal if, in the absence of federal question jurisdiction, any served defendant is a citizen of the forum state). CAFA lifts this limit, but still ties removal jurisdiction to original jurisdiction.
79 See 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3721, at 292 ("In general, and of cardinal importance, an action is removable from a state court to a federal court only if it might have been brought in the latter originally. This requirement that all of the conditions for original jurisdiction must be satisfied before removal will be allowed has been enforced in innumerable cases by courts at all levels of the federal judiciary."). Of course, special removal statutes authorize rare removal that goes beyond original jurisdiction. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § § 1442-1443 (2000) (authorizing removal for suits against federal officers and for certain civil rights matters). But these statutes are express exceptions to the linkage between removal jurisdiction and original jurisdiction, and in any event they do not involve jurisdictional amount. 80 See Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702 (1972) (focusing on the critical question of "whether the federal district court would have had original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that court"); Greenshields v. Warren Petroleum Corp., 248 F.2d 61, 65 (10th Cir. 1957) ("Removability is dependent upon the course of pleading actually used by the pleader and not by what he could have asserted had he so chosen."); 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3721, at 332 ("[T]he defendant cannot remove.., on the ground that an alternative course of conduct that would have permitted removal of the case was available to the plaintiff."); id. § 3722, at 453. 81 14B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 42, § 3722, at 437-60; id. § 3722.1. Likewise, the plaintiff can often defeat removal by joining a nondiverse party, subject to the fraudulentjoinder doctrine, which is supposed to be very narrow but is ever-exposed to illadvised judicial stretching. Clermont, supra note 41, at 1011 n.170. This pattern suggests that under current law, in the absence of express statutory change, the plaintiff should be able to use the various available devices broadly to defeat removal, with the defendant able to counter only by making an overwhelming showing of some sort.
UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 156: 1553 Therefore, the best approach in general, and even more so for CAFA cases where the question is new and where defendants' abuse is especially problematic, is to require that the removing defendant show to a legal certainty that any recovery will exceed the jurisdictional amount. If the defendant had to meet such a high standard, it would mean that the defendant would often fail in its removal effort.
Just as the plaintiff can very easily survive the St. Paul test for original jurisdiction, the plaintiff will very easily survive this legal-certainty test applied to removal and so will achieve remand. This standard of proof consistently enables the plaintiff to be the master of forum choice.
A lot rides on this point. The standard of proof is determinative of jurisdiction, meaning that the parties know what they are doing when they wage battle over this seemingly arcane point that we have now examined at some length. Plaintiffs will suffer disadvantage if the statute and its construction go one way, and defendants will suffer disadvantage if the rulings go the other way-that is, the party whom the court sticks with the burden of proof on a spongy jurisdictional determination will suffer.
3 Moreover, doctrine not only affects the parties' fortunes but also constrains the judges' freedom. Prior rulings strongly influence subsequent judicial decisions on doctrine. For example, prior decisions on the burden of proof produced the result that, in the CAFA context, the burden for jurisdictional requirements, as opposed to exceptions, is on the removing defendant. 4 82 A true test of legal certainty, being comparable to judgment as a matter of law, would be so high that few tort cases could survive it:
It would rarely seem possible that a defendant could prove that the amount of damages would, as a matter of law, have to exceed a certain amount, because few, if any, rules of law require damages of a certain amount to be awarded, such as those limiting amount or kinds of damages in certain situations. 83 Lonny Hoffman, in his empirical study of CAFA's jurisdictional exceptions, concluded that "allocation of the burden of proof is a key determinant in the forum contest's outcome." Hoffman, supra note 13, at 4. He had observed that the plaintiff heavily tends to win the forum contest when the burden of proof stays on the defendant, but heavily tends to lose when the court, as it usually does for CAFA exceptions, shifts the burden to the plaintiff. Id. at 3-4. Our results are consistent with this finding. In our district court jUrisdictional burden-of-proof cases, the plaintiff win rate was 52% when the dispute concerned jurisdictional requirements (with the burden typically on the defendant), but only 25% when the dispute concerned jurisdictional exceptions (with the burden typically on the plaintiff).
84 See supra text accompanying notes 36-38.
HeinOnline --156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1578 Rev. 2007 Rev. -2008 Thus, doctrine matters. We certainly do not contend to the contrary. But it remains possible that doctrine is not alone in influencing outcomes. We still must consider whether judicial attitudes for or against CAFA play a role, at least in some restricted realm of wriggle room. If so, and ifjudicial attitudes in fact incline against CAFA, then the hope of moving toward the optimal approach on standard of proof increases.
C. Judicial Reactions
The following data seem to show that both the district courts and the courts of appeals have resisted an expansive reading of CAFA. Because so many of the cases in our database were removed cases in which the plaintiff opposed application of CAFA, this resistant attitude among federaljudges resulted in a high plaintiff win rate.
We shall look first at the plaintiff win rate, because so much prior empirical research has emphasized this metric. We shall define "plaintiff win rate" as the fraction of plaintiff wins among the opinions in our database that went either for the plaintiff or the defendant, as opposed to decisions for neither. Then we shall shift to our measure of receptive/resistant reaction s5 in order to look more directly atjudicial disposition. We shall define "resistance rate" as the number of opinions in our database in which the court took a narrow view of CAFA, divided by the total of opinions in which the court took either a narrow or an expansive view of CAFA.
District Courts
The plaintiffs succeed in our cases at the unusual rate of almost two-to-one. This high plaintiff win rate could mean that the federal district courts are resisting what they see as improper use of CAFA by defendants. True, some plaintiffs are siphoning off cases squarely within CAFA by suing in federal court originally, and so bringing in
81,
state court a larger percentage of nonremovable cases.
Yet, defen dants are correctly seeing CAFA as a pro-defendant statute, which prompts them to overuse it by unsuccessfully removing or otherwise 85 See supra note 23. 86 See supra text accompanying note 27. trying to impose CAFA on plaintiffs.
8 7 Thus, the theory might run that the district courts, by resisting this sort of move by defendants, give plaintiffs the lopsided win rate we observe in published opinions.
Or it could be that the plaintiff win rate in the CAFA cases is not surprisingly high in the first place. True, defendants ordinarily do very well in removed cases, compared to original federal filings.
But perhaps plaintiffs have a high win rate in their efforts actually aimed at resisting removal. A couple of Alabama districts, for example, exhibit a peculiarly high rate of remand that exceeds 80% ""-nationally there is only about a 20% remand rate for removed actions. If in over half the cases there is no effort to remand, 9 ' the plaintiffs' national success rate would be a middling rate somewhat over 40%. Therefore, plaintiffs in our cases are doing remarkably well.
In any event, we would expect the defendants' failures to be concentrated at the beginning of CAFA's existence, as overly enthusiastic defendants flocked to the federal haven and the parties had not yet had the chance to adjust to the judiciary's statutory construction. In fact, the plaintiffs' 76% win rate in 2005 fell to 65% in 2006 and then to the more normal rate of 47% in 2007. Contrariwise, we would not expect the plaintiff win rate to vary much with primary subject area of the claims. Table 6 shows statistically insignificant differences. Recall that the three categories exhibiting the most extreme win rates, those categories other than contract and insurance, are the smallest categories in number of cases. We could state all of these results alternatively in terms of the receptive/resistant code, but the story would be the same. Given that most of the cases were removal cases, where a victory for plaintiff was the resistant position, the resistance rate will be similar to the plaintiff win rate. Accordingly, the district courts resisted expansion of CAFA 63.3% of the time over the two and a half years, while they gave the plaintiffs a 62.7% win rate. Tables 7 and 8 show that, in a fashion similar to the district court CAFA cases, the courts of appeals exhibited elevated plaintiff win rates on CAFA disputes (especially for effective-date issues) but showed no pattern across subject area of claims (for example, the 0% win rate in the "other subject" category simply means that the Brill decision, involving the Telephone Consumer Protection Act and being the only appellate case to fall into that category, was decided in favor of the defendant 9 2 ) . The 57% overall plaintiff win rate on appeal reflects who won the appeal, plaintiff or defendant, regardless.of who the appellant was. The plaintiffs' 89% win rate in 2005 fell to 52% in 2006 and then to 40% in 2007, a more normal rate for appellate courts. Other subjects 0
Courts of Appeals
Total 57 Most of the CAFA appeals (68%) resulted in affirmance, just as most non-CAFA appeals do. 93 Combining the high affirmance rate with the elevated plaintiff win rate in the district courts implies that plaintiffs should indeed have a high win rate for CAFA appeals. So, to get a better gauge of plaintiff success on appeal, we should instead compare the rate of reversal when the plaintiff is the appellant to the reversal rate when the defendant is the appellant. Ordinarily, plaintiffs see a dismal rate of success on appeal, with defendants doing more than twice as well-an effect that we labeled "plaintiphobia" in another article. '9 4 But in this regard, the CAFA appeals differ strongly from the ordinary: for CAFA, the defendants saw a 37% reversal rate in 35 cases, not statistically different from the 29% reversal rate for plaintiffs who appealed 7 cases. 125, 130-34 (2001) (noting the consistently high affirmance rates on appeal); supra note 10 (noting that the affirmance rate in all appellate dispositions is higher than the affirmance rate in published appellate dispositions). The affirmance rate, which is the complement of the reversal rate, means the percentage of appeals that reach a decisive outcome and emerge as affirmed rather than reversed. We narrowly define "affirmed" as affirmed or dismissed on the merits. We define "reversed" as reversed or modified, in part or completely. tends to show that it is opposition to extension of CAFA, rather than any aberrational pro-plaintiff attitude, that is driving the appellate judges. Apparently, the appellate courts' concern with CAFA causes them to overcome their usual leanings, which are pro-defendant relative to the district courts, and instead act like the district courts to restrict that statute's scope.
Again, we could state all of these results alternatively in terms of the receptive/resistant code, but the story would still be the same. In fact, the overall resistance rate in the court of appeals was 60%, quite consistent with the district courts' resistance rate of 63%. CAFA seems to be a matter that unites trial and appellate judges.
D. Regression Models
It looks as if judicial resistance to extension of CAFA was at work. Does this judicial resistance reveal ajudicial inclination that is at least somewhat political?
On the one hand, it very well could be that the judges were just playing a neutral role. They arguably faced down an onslaught of overly enthusiastic defendants, doing so by simply applying CAFA's existing restrictions and perhaps by invoking a few "neutral" maxims, such as their duty to construe narrowly any grant of jurisdiction. We must admit that, in repelling the onslaught, the courts did not create a visible pile of opinions outlandish enough to refute their neutrality.'' On the other hand, it is conceivable that the judges, on average, were expressing their disapproval of CAFA.' ' 7 That orientation could 96 An additional datum is that not one of our cases awarded 'just costs" for im- However, these results, developed one variable at a time, might be explainable by confounding factors. For example, perhaps Republican male judges adjudicate a different mix of CAFA issues than do other judges. Because we lack the benefit of a controlled experiment-and because filtering by the publication decision defeats random assignment-we cannot completely eliminate the possibility of confounders influencing our findings.
Nevertheless, we can at least use regression analysis to control for the various factors observable in the opinions. In our regression random assignment in a set of civil rights cases and then exploited random assignment of cases of the same case type to account for case characteristics. Another is Gregory C. Tables 3 and 5 show. The effective-date issue is the most distinctive type of CAFA dispute, as measured by plaintiff win rate. We therefore include in our regression analysis a dummy variable that equals 1 if the case involved CAFA's effective date. (2) Subject-area categories, as shown in Tables 1 and 6 , also show varying numbers and plaintiff win rates, so we include them in the regressions. But the statistical insignificance of the pattern suggests that this characteristic may not materially contribute to the models. (3) The removal or original genesis of the CAFA filing might be associated with case outcome. We therefore include a dummy variable for the origin of the case, equal to 1 when the case came to federal court via removal. (4) The models include a variable for the date of each opinion's decision, in order to account for any linear time trend in case outcomes.
Second, analysts have long associated case outcomes with judge characteristics, though findings of associations between outcomes and judge characteristics such as political party and gender have been inconsistent.l12 The party and gender effects reported above suggest including a dummy variable equal to 1 for Republican male judges. To help control for judges' age and experience, which might be associated with party or gender, we also include in the regression models each judge's birth year and confirmation year.
Third, district characteristics are potentially relevant because, for example, some commentators model judicial behavior as being responsive to traditional incentives, which include desire to minimize workload. If they are right, one would expect judges in busy districts to be less receptive to the increased burden on federal courts that would result from an expansive view of CAFA. We account in the regressions for district court caseloads by using the district-level measure of weighted case filings perjudge. 104 Table 9 shows the summary statistics for all of these variables used in our regression models. Note: Significance tested in the last column is the association between each variable and the dichotomous variable ofjudicial receptivity to CAFA; tests are based on Fisher's exact test for dichotomous variables and the Mann-Whitney test for continuous variables. N, the number of opinions for which all variables were ascertainable, is 156 (of a full sample of 182 opinions), representing a set that included opinions from 51 of the 56 districts and 116 of the 133judges. Table 10 reports regression results for models of judicial receptivity to CAFA, with each model utilizing a different set of variables. The regressions consistently show the Republican-male factor to have a significant effect on district court leaning. The coefficients' size and positive sign mean that such judges are markedly more receptive to an expansive reading of CAFA; the magnitude of the effect is indeed substantial, with the marginal effect being about a 20% increase in the probability of an expansive CAFA ruling. In addition, whether the case entailed an effective-date dispute consistently had a significant effect (judges appear less resistant to CAFA in later disputes, as the effective-date disputes fade away and the parties adjust to the judicial construction of the statute). Contrariwise, the insignificance of the factor representing docket pressure indicates that judges are not re-sisting CAFA merely because of a heavy workload. Something other than such narrow self-interest is motivating the judges. Note: Logistic regression is appropriate because the dependent variable is dichotomous. The decision date used in the models is the full date and not merely the year; robust z statistics are in parentheses; and standard errors are clustered by district. t Reduction in error = reduction in percent misclassified, compared to 64.7% by the naive model of always predicting againstjudicial receptivity to CAFA. + Significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
HeinOnline --156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1590 Rev. 2007 Rev. -2008 The set of all published opinions to date allows us to conclude that most federal judges have resisted CAFA. However, this set of opinions overwhelmingly featured threshold disputes about effective date or federal jurisdiction, rather than involving matters of certifica-
• 105 tion and the merits.
So, judicial resistance may be aimed only at CAFA's intent to funnel cases from state to federal courts, rather than rejecting CAFA's more substantive distaste for class actions.
Statutory and rule fixes may not work.'" Sometimes the law of unintended consequences causes the fix to have an effect opposite the one intended.' 0 7 The effects of CAFA could be big or small, and on balance they could favor defendants or in the end even favor plaintiffs. It is too early to tell. This Article is but the first piece of evidence. It suggests that federal judges may dampen any big effects that would have favored the defendants.
This Article is not the place to develop our own views of the merits of CAFA, beyond noting that big parts of its motivation and effectuation appear to us to be questionable 18 and that at least initially defendants greeted it with too much enthusiasm. ' We therefore lean toward considering the judicial resistance to be wise. Of course, we recognize that our evaluation is value laden-but then so is the judges' reaction.
105 See supra note 34.
06 See, e.g., Kuo-Chang Huang, Mandatory Disclosure: A Controversial Device with No Effects, 21 PACE L. REv. 203, 262 (2000) (concluding that the mandatory disclosure amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure failed to achieve their goals of expediting the disposition of cases and reducing litigation costs).
107 Cf Robert A. Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43 B.C. L. REv. 819, 821 (2002) (finding inaccurate the frequent claims that a law will produce results directly contrary to those intended).
:08 See supra notes 3-4. 09 See supra Part 1lI.C (noting a high plaintiff win rate shortly after CAFA's enactment).
